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# What it's Like to be Reviewed by Morons: How *Cognitive Linguistics* Has Executed Newton[1]

## Foreword

This essay is a reply to the reviewers of the article I submitted to the journal *Cognitive Linguistics* in 2016. The paper was on image schemata and was titled: *The OBJECT image schema, its role in other image schemata, and their prenatal foundations.*[2] The paper was rejected by *Cognitive Linguistics* on the basis of two negative reviews and one positive. I am professor emeritus of Poznań University, Poland, with 58 years of academic career, author of over 100 works, and in the last decade I have published over 20

1. I would like to express my deep gratitude to Gary Mead, writer and journalist, not only for proofreading, but more for his very illuminating, professional suggestions and friendly advice. Thank you, Gary.

2. Its slightly revised version was published as Szwedek (2018) and is also accessible on my Academia.edu and Researchgate sites.

articles on cognitive linguistics, particularly on the theory of metaphor and image schemata. My profile can be accessed on Academia.edu.

In my whole academic career I have not seen such a shabby, incompetent and dishonest, almost on the verge of ill-will, reviewing, and this is why I decided to make my detailed response public on Academia.edu, ResearchGate, with a copy sent to the Editor-in-chief of *Cognitive Linguistics*.

## At the outset I would like to offer the following general comments:

i) The majority of the reviewers' (hereafter 'R', or 'R2') criticisms are quoted and answered in detail. Each point is introduced by a caption indicating the nature of the problem at issue.

ii) R's critical remarks abuse common sense, showing total ignorance of linguistics, lack of basic education, gross indecency, and are often written with ill will and even downright stupidity. Because of such an abusive accumulation of R's vices, I will let the facts speak for themselves.

iii) It is obvious that R read only a few fragments of the paper, and those that s/he may have read, s/he read without even an attempt to understand.

iv) Partly following Hitchcock's adage that "a film should start with an earthquake, and then the stress should continuously increase", I will start and end the following remarks with two earthquakes, with more or less minor or major eruptions in between.

## Introduction

In my paper I put forward the following new claims:

i) that all image schemata (hereafter ISs, unless in quotes) must include an OBJECT IS;

ii) that i) entails that all IS's except the object schema are relations between objects, making the OBJECT IS the only independent and thus fundamental mental structure; for example, LINK, all FORCES, CONTAINMENT and many other schemata represent relations between physical objects;

iii) that if IS's are part of our nervous system, which develops around the 7$^{th}$ week of gestation, then they, at least many of them, must also develop at around the same time, in consonance with the embodiment hypothesis;

iv) in connection with iii) I claimed (see point 20. below) that the most fundamental and primeval sense is the sense of touch, also developing around the 7th week of gestation. I concluded that if the sense of touch and the nervous system develop simultaneously, it is impossible that touch would leave no imprint on the nervous system.

v) I finally argued briefly that the IS's which develop in the prenatal period, presumably have the same representations as those postulated for the postnatal period.

The paper was rejected without giving me any opportunity for defence. It is important to add that the reviewers themselves expressed contradictory opinions about the major topic of my paper. R writes that my claims are "not original and do not add much to the existing literature on image-schemas", while R2 asserts that "This paper has an interesting topic (the nature of the largely neglected OBJECT image schema)."

Here is the discussion, point by point, of a large selection of critical comments.

## R: it is only TYPICALLY ("at least typically") that objects have volume.

This is R's first earthquake assertion in connection with R's concern that I have chosen a circle as a diagrammatical representation of the OBJECT IS. R writes that "[t]hen it [the paper] proposes a diagrammatic representation of the OBJECT schema consisting of a circle, which captures its bounded nature [see below for more comments on R's opinion about my choice of a CIRCLE]. All this is highly problematic. If 'density' is the fundamental property of objects, it follows that **objects (at least typically) have volume.**" (emphasis A.S.)

This is a basic, commonsense or primary school knowledge. Since all physical objects are material, not just **typically**, but **all** must necessarily have volume. I would challenge R to show me a physical object that does not have volume.

## Why did the author choose a circle to represent the OBJECT schema?

R quibbles that: "A circle is two-dimensional and could be suggestive of the SURFACE IS. Then, one may wonder why the author prefers to use a circle and not a square or an oval or any irregular (but bounded) shape."

Firstly, R seems to be unaware of a simple fact that paper allows only for two-dimensional representation. Secondly, R is completely ignorant of the fundamental property of signs which is *l'arbitraire du signe* ('arbitrariness of the sign') introduced by de Saussure (1916) (cf. also Johnson (1987) and Langacker (2008, pp. 32–33) on the form of diagrams and their use of a circle). It is R's secret that R does not object to even more arbitrary, common use of arrows to represent FORCE (why not a fist or a cannon?), and Johnson's use of triangles, dots and rectangles and also arrows.

## No definition of an IS.

R2 opines that: "[o]ne major problem of this proposal is that the author does not provide a definition of image-schema. […] The author does not define the OBJECT schema (in fact, in general all image-schemas which are mentioned are not described either) and claims two different things: that OBJECT is an image-schema and that it is an element of other image-schemas. These two claims are completely different."

i) R2 here reveals not only ignorance of Clausner and Croft's (1999) paper, but also ignores my several mentions of that work, in which they say that that ISs "cannot be defined except by enumeration only". The *Stanford Philosophical Encyclopedia* (SPE) states that "the concept of *object* [is] among the most general concepts (or categories) which we possess. It seems very doubtful that it can be defined in more general terms […]" (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/object/).

ii) R2 does not know the difference between definition and description. While ISs have indeed not been defined[3] (see i) above), they have been described in my paper sufficiently well to be easily understood, and each schema was illustrated with language examples from OED. Just one example of such a description:

> "Since the aim of the paper is to expose the importance of the OBJECT schema, there is no particular order in which the ISs will be discussed. To show the intricacies of the analyses, I will begin with ENABLEMENT since Johnson's diagram looks relatively simple – a double, broken lines arrow. However, it is incompatible with his interpretation. He identifies two elements of ENABLEMENT, 'a potential force vector and the absence of barriers or blocking counterforces' (1987: 47), which we feel as the 'power (or lack of power) to perform some action, for example, the power to pick up the baby…' (1987: 47). Firstly, the diagram has no symbol of the potential energy source object, the one that has 'the power' to

3. Since then, they have been defined in both Szwedek (2018) and Szwedek (2019).

> act. Secondly, the phrase 'an absence of barriers' makes the absence irrelevant. Notice that in his 'you feel able to move a chair' example, he himself uses the word 'able', not 'enable'. While 'I feel able to move a chair' sounds good, *I feel enabled to move a chair* sounds odd, at best. Thus, his diagram and the description point to the ABILITY schema whose diagram below has the essential elements – an energy source object and the potential action, symbolized by a broken arrow."

If this is not a description, what is?

iii) R2's comment that my two claims, "that OBJECT is an image-schema and that it is an element of other image-schemas" are two completely different things, again reveals R2's incompetence in the field and ignorance of Johnson's work, in which he refers to complex ISs "built up from the basic ones through processes of combination, superimposition, and further elaboration or specification." (Johnson, 2005, p. 21).

## No clarification of debatable properties.

Writing about the OBJECT schema I claimed that the fundamental property of a physical object is its density, and other properties proposed by other authors are derivable from it.

i) On this, R offered the following comment: "3. Section 4 is devoted to the OBJECT schema. It first discusses its purported prototypical properties in view of previous work by other authors. The author then mentions that all these properties are debatable (without actually clarifying in what way) and proposes density as the fundamental property of the OBJECT schema."

ii) In section 4. of my paper I listed properties proposed by Krzeszowski (1991, p. 89), Schneider (1997, p. 95) and Santibáñez (2002, p. 186):

"A prototypical object

1) is experienced primarily by vision and touch (Krzeszowski)

2) is a unified whole (Santibáñez)

3) can be held in one hand (Krzeszowski; Schneider)

4) is bounded in space (Krzeszowski)

5) is threedimensional (Krzeszowski)

6) is inanimate rather than animate (Krzeszowski)

7) is man-made rather than natural (Krzeszowski)

8) can be manipulated (Krzeszowski; Santibáñez)

9) can be pointed to with one's finger (Schneider)."

iii) I then wrote: "All those features, except boundedness in space, are debatable and most of them have been questioned by Szwedek (2011) who pointed out that:

a) touch/tactility is more fundamental than vision, because it is the only sense with which we identify the density (physicality) of objects.

b) density entails three-dimensionality, manipulability, and pointability which thus are derived from density.

c) animate beings are also physical objects (Kotarbiński (1990 [1929]);

d) both man-made and natural things are objects."

Against R's insinuation, I submit that the issue has been sufficiently clarified, though R further on expresses doubts that animate beings are physical objects (see point 22. below). If we accept R's view, we would also have to admit that animate beings do not have density.

## The OBJECT IS may not be schematic.

R remarks: "The author seems to ascribe a high degree of schematicity to the notion of OBJECT." As the term clearly indicates, all ISs are (highly) schematic (Hampe, 2005), and this is what all cognitivists agree on (e.g.

Johnson, 1987; Clausner, & Croft, 1999; see also the *SPE* quoted above). All authors clearly state that it is impossible to determine which are more and which are less schematic. All this shows that R is not only ignorant of the basic literature, but moreover, has no idea what he is writing about.

## Is a geographical region an object?

A more specific criticism from R is that "NEAR/FAR could apply to any geographical region (not necessarily an object)." Clearly, R is unaware of basic cognitive literature. As Lakoff and Johnson (1980, p. 30) write, 'field' is conceptualized as a container (*in the field*) and CONTAINER IS AN OBJECT (p. 31), which means that field – a region – is also conceptualized as an object (Lakoff and Johnson use the phrase CONTAINER OBJECT) with NEAR/FAR pair applicable to it. Even more forceful is Langacker's description of the phrase 'under the bed is dusty' (which I mention in ft. 21 of my paper). Langacker writes that it is to be interpreted as "naming a spatial region – **a type of thing**" (Langacker 1993, p. 16) (emphasis mine; cf. also Szwedek's (2009) SPACE IS AN OBJECT conceptual metaphor).

## The 7th week of pregnancy is only "a bit earlier" than the 34th week

R asserts that "although the sense of touch develops a **bit earlier** [emphasis mine] than the rest of the senses in unborn babies [notice the unprofessional use of the word 'unborn babies' instead of 'foetuses'], this does not necessarily mean that it is more fundamental than the other senses from a developmental perspective." Chamberlain (n.d) clearly writes that touch develops around the 7th week of g.a. and "[w] hen tested from 28 to 34 weeks g.a. for visual focus and horizontal and vertical tracking, they usually show these abilities by 31–32 weeks g.a."),

so, given the duration of pregnancy (typically ca 38–40 weeks), touch is **considerably** earlier than just **a bit**.

The clear evidence that R did not read my paper is that s/he criticizes what s/he agrees with me on. R writes that "[p]ostnatal categorization makes use of visual perception extensively […]"; this is exactly what I wrote on p. 9 of my paper about the postnatal period: "when vision dominates in our experience."

## Prenatal vs preconceptual?

R questions my claim that "the problem of the prenatal foundations of schemata has been completely ignored", writing that "[t]his is not completely true. As the author knows, Johson [original spelling] argued that image schemas are preconceptual in origin." R repeats this in the form of a question: "Why does the introduction claim (erroneously) that the prenatal nature of the OBJECT schema has been ignored if, as the author points out here, the literature does claim that image schemas are preconceptual?"

This is a gross misunderstanding and incomprehensible confusion of prenatal with preconceptual. Contrary to what R suggests, prenatal does not mean preconceptual; prenatal period ends with birth, while I only write that the term 'preconceptual' was most often used for the postnatal period – there are many quotes of that situation in my paper which R did not notice, or did not understand. I never claimed that 'preconceptual' does NOT refer to the prenatal stage. If we take R's words at their face value, we would have to conclude that, the moment a baby is born, the preconceptual ISs miraculously become conceptual.

## Is a yard an object?

Referring to p. 4 of my paper, R asks whether "a yard (a tract of ground next to one or more buildings) is an 'object'?" and speculates that "[o]f course, if it is an object, it is not so in the same way as a plane. Are enclosures objects?"

Since I answered a similar question above (the 'field', i.e. a region, is a CONTAINER OBJECT, and Langacker's (1993) explanation quoted above), I can only conclude that R does not understand the fundamental distinction between physical objects and entities conceptualized as objects.

## Touch vs vision

i) On p. 9 of my paper I wrote that the sense of touch was mostly ignored by scholars who prioritize vision (cf. Szwedek 2000). R explained that the reason for that is that "language makes more extensive use of vision categories" which are thus fundamental. The simple questions that arise in that context are the following: a) Has R counted those TOUCHING and SEEING categories? b) Even if this were true (which I do not think it is), since when the greater number means more fundamental? In response to R's queries, here are just a few examples, from various languages, of the KNOWING IS TOUCHING metaphor (Szwedek, 2002; cf. also Lakoff, & Johnson UNDERSTANDING IS GRASPING, 1980, p. 20):

In **English** be*hold* means 'to catch sight of', per*ceive* comes from Latin *percipere* ('to take possession of'; f. *per* 'through, thoroughly' + *capere* 'to take', 'seize'), *capture* is derived from Latin *capere* 'to take', *take*, *grasp* and *catch* can be used in 'I take this to mean...'; 'to grasp the rudiments of the science', and 'to catch the exact meaning'.

In **German** *fassen* means 'to touch, catch' and also 'to understand'; *greifen* means 'to catch' and *begrifen* 'to understand'; *nehmen* means 'to take, and *zur KenntnIS's nehmen* 'to take notice'.

A common **Finnish** word for 'to understand' is *käsittää*, which comes directly from *käsi* ('hand') - i.e. the sense is that of 'grasping'. *Käsite* is a 'concept', i.e. something grasped.

Also, **Slavic** roots *-iąć*, *-imać* are derived from touching (*imać* comes from the same IE root as OE *naman*, German *nehmen*), for example, *u-jąć* ('to catch'), *po-jąć* ('to understand'). Other words: *chwytać* (literally 'to catch'; figuratively 'to understand'), *brać* (*słowa za dobrą monetę*) ('to take [understand] words at their face value').

**Hungarian** (Kiefer) ért 'to understand' comes from Old Turkish *er* 'to touch', 'to reach'. 'Touching, grasping' is related to 'understanding' also in the verb *fog* 'to grasp, to hold, to seize', in several lexicalized words: *fel+fog* – 'to comprehend'.

**Albanian** *nuk marr vesh* 'I do not understand' (*marr* = 'to take').

An interesting example comes from **Latin** *sapio* = 'to have taste'; →'to understand', 'to be wise'.

In **Tibetan**: *go* = 'to understand' ← 'to be full', 'to have enough of something'; *dgongs-pa* = 'to think', 'to consider' ← 'to weigh', 'to hold'; *yid-la-'dzin* = 'to think' ← lit. 'to mind-in-keep'. Similar relations can be found in the domain of emotions: 'to feel' *feel* (OHG. *fuolen* 'to handle', 'to grope'; Gr. *παλαμη*, L. *palma* (borrowed in ME from MF as *palm*), Skr. *pani* (from **palni*), OIr. *lám* (:---**pl~ma*).

ii) Secondly, R is wrong claiming that "there is little that touch can tell us that we cannot get through vision." Optical illusion may make it impossible to discern smoothness and roughness, and it is definitely impossible to discern density by sight. One might make a cube of foam look like it were made of metal, the density of which can only be verified by touch. For clarification I wish to add that even gases, which is probably beyond R's imagination, have volume and density which is experienced by the sense of touch, for example, a gust of wind/air.

iii) Further on, R claims that "through touch we can discern volume (also through vision), but not necessarily the concentration of matter." This is an odd statement. How does R think it possible to discern through touch the volume of a house, not to mention the earth, but not the concentration of matter of those objects?

In another place, R accuses me of "**discarding** Sweetser's metaphor UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING", referring to my argument that "ultimately KNOWING/UNDERSTANDING IS TOUCHING (see section 5.2. for many examples from various languages [and ftn. 36 of the paper, for that matter], and not as Sweetser proposed KNOWING/UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING." (p. 9). Since when 'ultimately' in English means 'discarding'? Should R read ftn. 36, it would be clear (or perhaps it wouldn't, given the level of intellect that R exhibits throughout the review) that while the UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING metaphor is obvious Sweetser (1990), we also have UNDERSTANDING IS TOUCHING and SEEING IS TOUCHING metaphors, both referring to touching and making touching the ultimate domain (see copious examples from many languages above). However, there are no metaphors that I have seen, like TOUCHING IS SEEING.

## Objectification

R questions my statement that "all abstract entities are conceptualized in terms of objects", and asks: "Love is a CONTAINER, progress is MOTION; more is UP; less is DOWN. Are the CONTAINER, MOTION, UP/DOWN ISs OBJECTS?"

Firstly, containers simply **are** objects (Lakoff, & Johnson, 1980, p. 31), and LOVE is conceptualized as an object in the following few selected metaphorical expressions (Szwedek, 2010):

LOVE IS AN OBJECT

*I **gave** her all my **love**.*

*He **sought for love** in the wrong places.*

LOVE IS A PLANT

*Perhaps the old monks were right when they tried to **root love out**; …*

Olive Schreiner *The Story of an African Farm*, (1883).

LOVE IS A SUBSTANCE

*She was **filled with love**.*

LOVE IS A HUMAN BEING

***Love is blind**.*

***Love is too young** to know what conscience is.* Shakespeare *Sonnet* 151.

LOVE IS AN OPPONENT

*She was **overcome by love.***

LOVE IS FOOD

*He **hungered for love**.*

*He's **love-starved**.*

LOVE IS A CONTAINER (structure)

*To fall **in love.***

*All the little **emptiness of love**!* Rupert Brooke, *Peace*.

i) Secondly, progress and motion are conceptualized as objects in the following selected metaphorical expressions:

*to make progress*, *to take progress*, *in progress* (progress as a container);

*in motion*, *go through the motions*, *to make a motion*, *much motion*, *warm motion* (Shakespeare), *decent motion*.

As to up/down, OED has the following examples:

*The bad choice of the situation in such a country; it is all **ups** that should be **downs**.*

*Drainage work on the up and up.*

Obviously, some metaphors are more frequent than others, and perhaps some are more difficult to explain than others, but the above examples clearly show that abstract entities are conceptualized in terms of physical objects.

## KNOWING/UNDERSTANDING IS TOUCHING

In my paper I wrote that "ultimately KNOWING/UNDERSTANDING IS TOUCHING [see the examples in point 11. above] […], and not only, as Sweetser (1990) proposed, just KNOWING/UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING." R comments "In general, scholars agree that both SEEING and TOUCHING are experiential source domains for UNDERSTANDING. So, if UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING has to be discarded as a correlation metaphor, this point would need some more explanation." As R should know, the word 'ultimately' in no way means that I discard UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING. Moreover, R did not seem to notice my examples in section 5.2 and ftn. 36 which clarify these relations. Since UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING, and UNDERSTANDING and SEEING IS TOUCHING (the latter in such phrases as *sharp vision, our visions met* (OED), *bear sight, catch sight of,* and metonymically *her eyes rested on him, to keep/have an eye on something, put one's eye on, catch one's eye*), then for the latter, TOUCHING is the ultimate domain, more fundamental than SEEING.

## Preconceptual and prenatal again

I stated that "all those scholars ignored the fact that bodily experience does not begin with birth". R makes the following comment:

"No, they have not. 'Preconceptual' and 'prelinguistic' do not mean postnatal nor prenatal only. By 'preconceptual' scholars generally mean before the time when people develop frame-like

structures and, especially, before thinking can become abstract and symbolic. It can go back to the time in which infants [note again the unproffesional use of the term 'infant' instead of 'foetus'] interact with their environment in their mothers' wombs. In addition, if ISs are postulated to be ALL prenatal, this would exclude any ability to schematize sensorimotor experience after birth, which is likely not the case. So, the term 'preconceptual', if well defined, can be an adequate one and 'prenatal' could only be partially accurate."

R's words are an absurd distortion of what I wrote:

i) The distinction between preconceptual and prenatal is exactly what I claimed, so, obviously, the criticism is totally misdirected.

ii) In no place did I postulate that "ISs are ALL prenatal." I only claimed that "most schemata commonly proposed in literature are present in the foetal life." R again did not read, or did not understand, or more likely, did not want to understand, what I wrote.

ii) I also emphasized the role of other senses in the development of schemata after birth (e.g. p. 52).

## Tactility

On p. 10 of my paper, R selected the phrase "the exclusion of tactile experience", and writes that tactility "is not excluded at all", referring to Gibbs' (2005) words: "image schemas exist across all perceptual modalities". Again, R did not notice that all the time I point out that most research on ISs concentrates on the postnatal period and the sense of vision. It is in this context that I wrote that "all those scholars [studying the postnatal period and vision] ignored the fact that bodily experience does not begin with birth. The exclusion of [prenatal] tactile experience [...] is a serious methodological mistake." (p. 10). Gibbs' (2005) study is mainly concerned with vision in the postnatal

period. In his 2008 paper, he lists the modalities and puts vision first, followed by hearing, and only then **feeling**, tasting, and smelling. Also, Johnson (1987) writes that "our visual schemas seem to predominate" (p. 25) – I quote both scholars on p. 44.

## Image schema and manipulation

R advised me to keep in mind "that Johnson (1987: 25) equated the term 'image schema' with 'embodied schema' with its origin in any form of sensorimotor experience, including touch. It has never been excluded. In fact, the account Johnson gives of the CONTAINER image schema is related to object manipulation, the experience of putting things (water, food, air) into our bodies or taking them out, spatial orientation, boundedness, motion into and out of places, etc."

i) As I have written above, I never claimed that touch has been totally excluded, but that it was omitted from most postnatal studies to the advantage of vision.

ii) It is true that the CONTAINER IS is related to object manipulation, but not necessarily connected with manipulation. Containers exist without manipulation. R confuses the concept of CONTAINER with CONTAINMENT, i.e. with the IN/OUT relation

## FORCE and PATH

Commenting on my words on p. 14 that "force is not an independent element, as Peña seems to be suggesting", R writes that "[w]hat Peña says in the quote above is that PATH and FORCE are interrelated. So, where is the suggestion that FORCE is an independent element?"

i) Yet R claimed earlier that there can be a PATH without an object moving along it, that is, without FORCE driving the object; so R clearly implied that FORCE (experienced as motion) is independent of PATH.

ii) Ignoring the crucial part of that paragraph in my paper, R distorted my statement. What I wrote is "…force is not an independent element, as Peña seems to be suggesting, but it is inseparably connected with objects. It is the objects' potential energy that can exert force on other objects causing their motion along a path, in other words, an OBJECT moving along a surface of another OBJECT creates a PATH schema."

iii) On p. 8, referring to Pena's diagram of PATH, I wrote: "She does not notice that paths require 'objects' that would move on the paths." R observes that "It is possible to think of a path without a moving object (e.g. an empty road)." Again, R did not notice my explanation that "**if a path is related to motion**, there must be an object moving along a path." Additionally, as I (also Langacker, 1993, p. 16) argued above, "an empty road" (a stretch of ground like a field) is conceptualized as an OBJECT.

## Why is the object an indispensible element of our reality?

R objects to my statement that "it is the object that is the indispensable element of our reality" and asks "But why? Why not the notion of containment? Are all bounded regions in space envisaged as OBJECTS? Sometimes they clearly are (a bottle), but is a pond an object? Or the ocean? Or outer space? Again, the author refers to a number of papers but does not explain what they say."

i) R did not make an effort to read those papers, asking me to repeat them in the paper under discussion, though earlier R complained that my paper is too long.

ii) Not only did R NOT read the paper attentively, but what is worse, R does not understand the process of metaphorical conceptualization of, for example, a pond, the ocean or outer space

(see my earlier remarks on 'field'). The word 'envisage', which I never used, has nothing to do with 'conceptualization'.

iii) A question arises as to how R imagines containment without a container (which is an object – physical or conceptualized as physical, see Lakoff and Johnson: in sight, in the field of vision, in mind, in thoughts, etc. etc.).

## Events do not exist (Kotarbiński, 1929)

Quoting Kotarbiński (1929), I stated that "Events do not exist" (p. 18), to which R answered that "Events happen; if they happen or "take place", then they exist. The whole universe is full of dynamic events that simply 'are'. And we try to account for their existence." It is obvious that R is not only ignorant of Kotarbiński's *reism*, which I also refer to in my paper, but did not care to notice my quotes of that philosopher. In brief, events do not have a physical existence, i.e. density – e.g., you cannot see or touch horse race. What you can see or touch are horses, riders, turf, etc., not the race. If Kotarbiński is not familiar to R, maybe Franz Brentano is.

## Is touch more fundamental?

R questions my claim that touch is "more fundamental", asking: "What are the criteria to determine whether a sense is more or less 'fundamental'? Sight has given rise to many more metaphors across languages. Wouldn't that make it more 'fundamental'?" This criticism is absurd.

i) Has R counted sight metaphors and tactile metaphors? Is number a criterion of fundamentality? Since there are more insects than people, are insects more fundamental? My example of KNOWING/SEEING IS TOUCHING metaphor above (points 11. and

13.) suggests that touch is more fundamental, as I have not found any TOUCHING IS SEEING metaphor.

ii) I consider touch more fundamental for reasons expounded on p. 22 (point 5.2.) of my paper and repeated below:

a) The foetus is sensitive to stimulation of the skin, especially in the area around the mouth, by the 7th week of pregnancy (Chamberlain n.d.; Kornas-Biela, 2011), while "the visual focus and tracking begin around the 31st week" (Chamberlain n.d., p. 3);

b) Touch, unlike the 'telecommunicative' senses (Pöppel, & Edingshaus, 1994), provides the closest possible experience of the physical world (Popova, 2005);

c) Touch is the only sense that provides a three-dimensional perception of objects;

d) Touch, including the vital sense of taste, is the only whole body sense reaching "full body sensitivity by the 32nd week" (Chamberlain n.d., p. 1);

e) The most vital haptic organs – the hands and mouth – have the largest neuronal representations in the brain;

f) *Encyclopedia Britannica notes that "[t]actual sensations enable one to differentiate his own body from the surrounding environment", where "[t]he body of the individual seems to function as a perceptual frame of reference."* Popova (2005, p. 401) confirms that "[t]ouch thus incorporates selfawareness uniquely and distinctly from the other senses", and stresses that "the tactile sense is a unique modality in which stimulation is *obtained rather than imposed by the stimulus." (Popova, 2005, p. 401).*

g) *The fundamental character of touch translates into linguistic structures, as I noted above (point 11. above).*

h) *Finally, we can close our eyes and not see, we can plug our ears and not hear, we can stop our noses and not smell, but there is no way in which we*

*can STOP touching and being touched by our clothes. Even if we can levitate in order not to touch the floor, our bodies are still touched by the air.*

## Is a black hole an object?

R more than once asks whether a black hole is an object. A 'black hole' is conceptualized as an object as all the other concepts – pond, ocean, outer space. I can only conclude that R has never heard about the Conceptual Metaphor Theory. Consulting dictionaries for metaphoric expression for 'black hole' might help him understand the problem.

## Animate beings are not physical!

Referring to the Great Chain of Being, I stated on p. 19 that "animate beings are also physical objects". R writes that "This depends on how one defines the notion of OBJECT versus ENTITY, BEING, etc. Are all the items in the GREAT CHAIN OF BEING objects?"

i) referring to Kotarbiński (1929) (who clearly states that animate beings are also physical objects), I pointed out that physical means consisting of matter, which entails that human beings are also physical objects.

ii) Even God is conceptualized in terms of a physical object, mostly in human form, such as a 'gardener', 'teacher', 'shepherd', etc., but also, for example, as 'a bedrock'.

iii) R proposes: "This should be discussed. Besides, animate beings may be able to manipulate objects or to have some degree of control over them." This suggestion, that animateness is based on the ability to manipulate other objects, in contrast to, for example, chairs, is absurd. I can imagine Arnold Schwarzenegger physically manipulating (playing with) a baby who then, despite R's doubts, would have to be considered a physical object.

iv) On p. 20, I wrote that "it has been demonstrated that abstract entities, for example, ideas (Reddy, 1979), thoughts, time, space, emotions (e.g. fear) and events (e.g. race = contest) (Szwedek, 2009; 2011) are conceptualized as objects", which R comments: "and as substances and as bounded regions in space (which are not objects)." It is quite clear again that R is unfamiliar with the notion of conceptualization.

## Is surface an independent object?

R questions my statement that "SURFACE [...] can be referred to as an independent object", and asks: "Why?? can we think of surfaces without making reference to objects and masses?" Naturally, we cannot think of surfaces without objects, but we do conceptualize surface as an independent object. Even Hampe (2005, pp. 2–3) lists SURFACE as a separate IS, and my examples (9 and 10 in my paper) show that it is treated in language as a separate object (e.g. *thin surface has been carried away*; see also OED definition of surface).

## Touch and taste, and closest contact

On p. 45, I state that "touch [...] provides the closest possible experience of the physical world". And R asks: "What is meant by closest? Does it mean that it involves physical contact? Then, 'taste' should be on a par with touch since it also involves physical contact with the taste buds of the tongue." Has R really read my paper?

i) It is clear (although not for R) that touch involves physical contact (except metaphorically). R should tap R's head and see whether R did it without a physical contact.

ii) How could R have missed my words on the very same page: "touch, **including the vital sense of taste?**" Again, the conclusion that R did not read the paper is inevitable.

## Prenatal and postnatal multimodality

At one point R finally decides to agree with me writing that: "If what the author wants to suggest is that touch is the main prenatal source of information for the creation of the OBJECT image schema, that is probably so." But R cannot help adding that we should note that: "image schema are both pre- and postnatal and that the full range of characteristics of the OBJECT schema is ascribed to it after birth, on the basis of broader experience with objects through vision, smell, hearing, and taste."

Again, if this is meant to be a critical remark, R must have missed my words, if only on p. 48, where I wrote: "However, there should be little doubt that image schemata develop simultaneously with the nervous system, and in a much richer way in the postnatal period in consequence of multimodal experiences", and then on p. 52: "[…] the foundations of image schemata are laid in the prenatal period, and they continue to develop multimodally after birth." And in conclusion I added: "Obviously, this initially simple, instinctual relation between touch and the nervous system would change with the development of both – multimodally in later stages." R's repetition as criticism of what I wrote clearly in a number of places is yet another piece of evidence that R was not really "in touch" with my paper.

## Do we notice touching?

On p. 47, I wrote that "we do not notice touching because it is always part of our bodily experience". To which R answered that "This is a misrepresentation of the way tactile input is used as a source of knowledge. We do notice touching. The hands and fingers are particularly important in this respect. We also correlate and integrate information from different perceptual sources."

i) If R understood the meaning of the word 'notice', as it is given in OED ('to take notice of'; 'to observe', 'to become aware of'), R would possibly refrain from such a mindless comment. Does really R notice, i.e. become aware of the air touching his body, or R's feet touching the floor while walking? Does R really think: 'Aha! I am walking so I am touching the floor', or that 'I am wiping my nose now, so I am touching it'? Does R really always consciously think: 'There must be air surrounding me because I feel it touching my skin?'

ii) As to the last sentence in R's paragraph, I wrote many times that ISs develop multimodally (see my quote in point 25 above).

iii) Not only hands (see point 20. above), but also mouth and genitals (cf. the picture of homunculus in any relevant source).

iv) Then R continues: "For example, we tend to think of big objects as heavier than smaller objects, although we know that sometimes, because of their higher density, small objects can be very heavy and large objects can be light." Apart from the triviality of that statement, at least R finally acknowledged density as a property of objects.

## Development of senses

R criticizes my statement: "when other senses have not developed yet", writing that "This is wrong. Experts in prenatal psychology and physiology know that the so-called distal (vision, hearing, taste, smell) and proximal senses (touch, body position, movement) develop 'in utero'. For example, hearing begins within the fifth week of gestation (as evidenced by ultrasound measurements of fetus' motor responses and cardiac acceleration when sound is transmitted to the mother's abdomen through an oscillatory source). It is true that touch is the first sense to develop in the fetus, but taste, smell, balance and hearing soon follow; later on, vision is developed."

i) R's statements are contradictory. First, R writes that giving chronological priority to touch, "when other senses have not developed yet", is wrong and a few words later R admits that "It is true that touch is the first sense to develop in the fetus".

ii) And again, it is clear that R didn't read my paper where, in fn. 36, I quote Chamberlain (n.d.): "When tested from 28 to 34 weeks g.a. for visual focus and horizontal and vertical tracking, they usually show these abilities by 31–32 weeks g.a." Why R repeats what I wrote and criticizes what R her/himself agrees with, is beyond my and possibly anybody's comprehension.

## CONTACT schema

On CONTACT schema on p. 48, R writes: "The assumption that the CONTACT schema is not enriched significantly in the postnatal period..." I challenge R to indicate the place where I make an assumption that CONTACT schema is not enriched in the postnatal period.

R continues: "[...] while the other image schemas are enriched, is inconsistent with what we know about the integration of information from the various sensory inputs in the prenatal period. Image schemas are enriched by more than one sensory input from the prenatal period. Even if we do not take into account integration, this assumption remains questionable. Are we to assume that a baby's OBJECT schema, once he/she has learned to hold objects and feel their weight, is the same he/she had before being born?"

On p. 11, I wrote that "Image schemata develop more variations in consequence of the development of the nervous system and the senses through the prenatal and postnatal periods." My conclusion is the same as above: R did not read my paper – just pretended to read it without any understanding.

## Isn't density also a property of substances?

Further on, R criticizes my words "that density is the most essential property of objects", asking: "Isn't density also a property of substances? How do the OBJECT and MASS image schemas relate?"

i) Substances are also CONCEPTUALIZED as objects, as I argued throughout my paper.

ii) Where did I write that substances do not have density? If density is the most basic property of matter, substances, including gases have it, though in various degrees.

## GRAND FINALE EARTHQUAKE: Isaak Newton at last unmasked by *COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS*

On p. 33 of my paper, referring to attempts to classify ISs, I suggested that "...all variations of FORCE can be subsumed under COUNTERFORCE since, as Newton's Third Law states quite clearly 'For every action there is an equal and opposite reaction.'" To which R2 responded with ingenious mastery: "I do not think that Newton's statement means that all kinds of forces are in fact manifestations of counterforce."

i) I could not agree more with the beginning of that statement. Indeed, throughout R's review it is evident that R "does not think".

ii) The rest is false. The term 'FORCE' is an objectification (Langacker and others would call it 'reification') of something like 'force exertion' (there is no force without exertion). That means that FORCE is action, and if an instance of action causes "an equal and opposite reaction", all forces can be subsumed under the concept of COUNTERFORCE. As a friend of mine, a Professor of physics explained, departures from Newton's Third Law occur in vacuous outer space, but never in our cognitive, earthly reality.

I wish to end this response with one jibe and two recommendations. First the jibe. As Albert Einstein quipped: "The difference between stupidity and genius is that genius has its limits." The recommendations: if the reviewers are only ignoramuses, there is still hope. They might want to follow the advice of Isaac Watts (1674–1748), the English theologian and logician: "Acquaint yourself with your own ignorance." If they can do that, then Don Wood's reflection might be applicable: "Ignorance can be fixed, stupid is for ever."

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